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Abstract. Cloud computing paradigm is gaining more and more mo-
mentum, to the extent that it is no more confined to its initial application
domains, i.e. use by enterprises and businesses willing to lower costs or
to increase computing capacity in a flexible manner. In particular, in-
creasing interest is recently being paid to the huge potentials - in terms
of benefits for the society at large - that might result from the adoption
of cloud computing technology by critical infrastructure (CI) operators.
This is of course putting special emphasis on the need for dependable
and trustworthy security mechanisms in cloud technology based services,
since a critical infrastructure is vital for essential functioning of a coun-
try. Incidental or deliberate damages to a CI have serious impacts on
the economy, and possibly make essential services unavailable to the
communities it serves. In this paper we present the proof-of concept of
a cloud-based Water Supply Network Monitoring (WSNM) application,
named RiskBuster (RB), that ensures the confidentiality and integrity of
SCADA monitoring data collected from dam sensors and stored in the
cloud by using the innovative Intel Software Guard eXtension (SGX)
technology.
1 Introduction
The industrial community is now aware of the tremendous advantages coming
from the adoption of Cloud technologies. The outsourcing to the Cloud is a well-
consolidated trend in many fields, which has a unique barrier: the exposure of
sensitive data to security risks. While some companies have overcome this fear
by relying in the efforts spent by academic and industrial communities to make
the cloud more secure, others are still skeptical due to the increasing numbers
of attacks occurred in the last years.
In this sense, a glaring example comes from the Critical Infrastructure (CI) sec-
tor, an essential branch of societies in terms of economic viability and livability,
spanning all countries’ fundamental facilities such as energy, telecommunications,
water supply, transport, finance, and health. Through a Cloud-based Supervi-
sory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, providers and users can
dramatically reduce costs eliminating the expenses related to the installation and
maintenance of IT infrastructures, enhance functionalities, and achieve greater
reliability.
However, CIs do not undertake to the Cloud Computing (CC) hampered by se-
curity concerns. Unlike other sectors, in fact, CIs have more stringent security
requirements due to the terrible impact that attacks directed to different targets
including assets, networks, and systems may have on Nations’ safety, prosper-
ity, and well-being. Evidences as the recent ”Black Energy 3” attack enforced in
Ukraine [1] in 2015 or the ”Havex” SCADA-focused trojan launched in 2014 [2],
demonstrate how important is the security of Industrial Control Systems (ICS).
The adoption of cloud for critical applications needs new approaches and meth-
ods. Emerging technologies have the potential to meet the demands of security
coming from CIs organizations.
In this work we propose RiskBuster (RB), a proof-of-concept of a cloud-based
application for a Water Supply Network Monitoring (WSNM) use case. Unlike
traditional applications RiskBuster is designed to make use of advanced security
mechanisms provided in the context of the Secure Enclaves for REactive Cloud
Applications (SERECA) project3. In particular, RB aims to protect the confi-
dentiality and integrity of sensitive monitoring data stored in the cloud using
Intel Software Guard eXtension (SGX), the new extension of Intel Instruction-
Set Architecture (ISA) provided in newest Skylake processors.
SGX permits to protect application state from the hypervisor and the operating
system. Since all data is encrypted in memory in Secure Enclaves, and only the
CPU has access to the encryption keys, even physical access to a machine does
not help to gain access to data protected with SGX.
The incorporation of secure enclaves into a cloud computing software stack could
allow an extremely high level of security in RiskBuster, which makes the adop-
tion of cloud much more reliable for the Critical Infrastructures. We believe that
our work gives a significant contribution in this sense.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports other
works moving in our same direction. Section 3 analyzes the type of threats that
may arise in a cloud environment. Section 4 describes the WSNM use case by
also classifying the type of requirements. Section 5 provides an overview of the
monitoring application by reporting the technological choices and how we con-
ceive the integration with SGX to counter security threats. Finally, section 6
concludes the document.
2 Related Work
Protecting CIs in cloud and non-cloud platforms is of main concern [9][7][6][3].
The process of critical infrastructures cloudification is testified most of all in
the field of SmartGrids. Such infrastructures are particularly worrying in terms
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of security as depicted in [10]. Several works discuss the advantages in leverag-
ing cloud techniques to meet the demand for increasingly intelligent and cost-
effective systems. In this regard, Bera et al. [3] provided a thorough survey in
which they analyzed the impact on SmartGrids, positive and non, of a migration
to the cloud. In particular the discussion was focused on three main aspects: en-
ergy management, information management and security. It is precisely the last
one that is left as an open issue by the authors due to the many existent defi-
ciencies of current protection systems. Therefore, it is not surprising that they
reported a huge amount of researches related to possible security mechanisms
in SmartGrid applications. However, none of these rely on innovative solutions
that can address the extraordinary security requirements of CIs.
An approach for a secure Cloud-based monitoring system was proposed by Sule
et al. [9], which in their work describe a secure cloud deployment for mission
critical applications in the energy sector. Their solution was based on the usage
of Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) to eliminate the need of custom software
and patches by enforcing hardware integrity measurement and testing through a
cryptoprocessor provided in cloud providers’ nodes. Such a technique produces
a Static Root of Trust Measurement (SRTM) useful to verify all the software
loaded since BIOS. Moreover, to enhance their work, the authors showed how
this solution affects the performances declaring an additional overhead caused
by the cryptoprocessor of 2.65 second. The mechanism employed is on the same
vein of our solution proposed, however Intel SGX does much more. It builds
a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) that allows a Dynamic Root of Trust
Measurement (DRTM). SGX no longer depends on the TPM to enforce measure-
ments, sealing and attestation. Instead there is a special enclave that emulates
the TPM. There is no more an external co-processor, everything runs on main
CPU so is much faster.
In the same way, Baker et al. [6] presented a concept for a cloud platform to
reinforce the integrity and security of SOA-based SCADA systems exploited in
the context of Critical Infrastructures. The paper makes use of requirements
imposed by a SmartGrid CI to highlight the applicability of the proposed plat-
form in a real world scenario. They analyzed a collection of existing measures
(e.g. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC))
to define a ’Security Toolbox’ that could be adopted to guarantee an acceptable
level of security. Furthermore, they proposed a Multilevel User Access Control
Layer (MLAC) used to connecting users to the most appropriate SCADA node
according to their role and credentials. This work can only give a partial contri-
bution to address security issues, in fact, a more complex threat model in which,
e.g, cloud administrators are malicious would be unmanageable.
3 Threats to CIs in a Cloud Environment
Although the migration of CIs’ IT to the cloud lays the foundation for advanced
cyber infrastructures - bringing with them a greater resistance to trivial attacks
and, most of all, an improvement of reliability - a number of new security threats
come out. Data loss or compromise, loss of organizational control, account hi-
jacking and Denial of Service (DoS) are the noteworthy risks that organizations
must take into account after proceeding to a cloud based IT infrastructure. The
research community is proposing new security solutions as testified in [5] where
authors survey current available security mechanisms in cloud infrastructures to
address most relevant open issues. However, it is still not enough. The adapta-
tion of Cloud-hosted SCADA systems to the cloud migration is paramount due
to the lack of appropriate security mechanisms in most used SCADA protocols
such as Modbus and DNP3 which do not support or perform authentication and
encryption.
According to NIST, cloud computing ”presents certain unique security chal-
lenges resulting from the cloud’s very high degree of outsourcing, dependence
on networks, sharing (multi-tenancy), and scale” [4]. Fernandes et al. [8] pro-
vide a survey of research literature to highlight cloud security open issues and
challenges. Some of them particularly concern the context of Industrial Control
Systems (ICS). We report here the most relevant ones:
– T1: Data Breach - CIs assets’ data is the main target of malicious intrusive
actions. Data confidentiality is certainly important but it is our belief that
data integrity is much more important because attacks (e.g., manipulating
sensor or control data) on the SCADA system could have terrible effects on
nearby population safety as it misleads operators into making wrong deci-
sions. Just think the impact of false data information on water quality in a
distribution network.
The problem of data outsourcing in a cloud migration is of immediate con-
cern.
– T2: Account or Service Traffic Hijacking - The attempt to steal the access of
operators is one way through which hackers can enforce malicious operations
against the CI. The intruder can get into critical areas of a deployed mon-
itoring service and possibly compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of those services.
– T3: Denial of Service (DoS) - The high availability of SCADA systems is
a fundamental requirement. Precisely for this reason, attackers may aim to
an outage of CIs through a DoS or Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack. This
attack is more dangerous in a cloud environment, since when the workload
increases with respect to a specific service, the cloud environment provides
additional computational power to that service. This means that on the one
hand the cloud system counters the effects of the attack, but on the other
hand it supports the attacker in his evil activity, by providing him with more
resources.
– T4: Shared Technologies Vulnerabilities - The multi-tenancy feature of cloud
technologies is extremely risky in terms of security if the hypervisor is not
well secured. An evil activity on CI data integrity and confidentiality may
be enforced through penetrations in virtual machines (VM) residing on the
same hypervisor.
– T5: Malicious Insiders - Malicious administrators of the Cloud Provider (CP)
or any other system administrator with privileged access to resources are a
consistent threat that traditional security mechanisms hardly are able to
cope.
4 The Water Supply Network Use Case
A civil Water Supply Network (WSN) infrastructure has been chosen as a use
case to validate and demonstrate our work. Such an infrastructure is extremely
representative because it is composed by assets like network pipes, dams, and
basins that make it a safety-critical infrastructure with strong security require-
ments.
Our WSN use case is under the administration of a public authority namely
Ente per lo Sviluppo dell’Irrigazione e la Trasformazione Fondiaria in Puglia,
Lucania ed Irpinia (EIPLI), which provides water to a large part of Southern
Italy population. EIPLI is in charge of the distribution of water - around 600
million cubic meters per year - for different uses (e.g. industrial, energetic, irriga-
tion, drinking) to the nearest population. Besides the management of the water
pipelines, the organization is also responsible of 8 dams with different storage
capacities up to 550Mmc.
A cloud-based real-time monitoring application is an attractive solution for WSN
administrators because they can discern from the burden of IT systems man-
agements costs and easily interconnect all the assets possessed, which are geo-
graphically distant between each other. Furthermore, except for the aspects of
security, the choice of adopting cloud technologies is further strengthened by
the requirements imposed (functional and non-functional) that we are going to
define in the following subsections.
4.1 Functional Requirements
Generally speaking, main monitoring functionalities needed by the WSN appli-
cation are: the water quality monitoring and control (e.g. water turbidity) in
order to avoid water pollution situations that could be disastrous for the popu-
lation; infrastructure integrity monitoring to ensure that there are no structural
problems in any part of the infrastructure (e.g. collection points, dams, tanks,
valves, and pipes); and other key parameters monitoring, particularly, those with
a direct impact on the operation of the water network (e.g. pipe pressure).
More specifically, the functionalities needed by the application are those typical
of a SCADA system. That is:
– FR1 - Sensor Data Acquisition - It is needed the data acquisition from sen-
sors, meters and field devices, such as photo, pressure, temperature and flow
sensors needed to monitor fundamental parameters for the water quality and
the infrastructure integrity.
– FR2 - Sensor Data Collection, storage and retrieval - The enormous amount
of data acquired by the sensors must be handled and stored for subsequent
analysis such as statistical trends, regulations, future load planning or billing.
– FR3 - Event and Alarms Processing - Any suspicious activity should be re-
ported by the WSNM application. An Alarm Management System (AMS)
must clearly show appropriate alarms indicating abnormal situations, vary-
ing priority and consequences, and keeping history of all the alarms gen-
erated. It must react with alarms of different level of importance in case
sensors measurements go out of certain thresholds. A correlation of events of
different nature should be enforced to produce representative and complex
alarms.
– FR4 - Monitoring through Human Machine Interface (HMI) - Operators
needs to interface with the system to monitor in real-time the status of the
WSN infrastructure and react to eventual alerts or alarms. They also need
to have access to the historic data storages to make appropriate assessments.
4.2 Para-Functional Requirements
The WSN is unarguably exposed to risks that are related to natural phenomena,
disasters, and criminal/terrorist activity. For this reason, the non-functional re-
quirements imposed, especially those related to the security and dependability,
are particularly stringent. These are the cause of the skepticism to promote a
serious migration of CI applications to the cloud. The monitoring application
should guarantee the following:
– NFR1 - Data Security - Critical decisions are usually taken using the mea-
surement data provided by the monitoring system. This means that data
confidentiality and, especially data integrity are of primary importance. The
WSN application should enforce mechanisms able to protect the data from
malicious accesses and modifications.
– NFR2 - Service Availability and Responsiveness - A timely response to prob-
lems in the WSN is an important requirement, e.g., to have operators react
quickly to critical conditions such as a terrorist attack on the WSN. Further-
more, it is equally important the continuous service provision. An outage
could be fatal for the population.
– NFR3 - Service isolation - As a CI, any system associated with the WSN must
comply with a variety of regulations and standards. Validation of compliance
is a complex and expensive process though, especially when third-party CPs
are involved.
– NFR4 - Scalability - The WSNM application must tolerate load peaks of the
processing throughput. This capability must be maintained also for an in-
creased number of feeding components (i.e. more sensors or event analysers).
– NFR5 - Interoperability - The application must support an easy integra-
tion of technologies of different nature and also allow the usage of software
modules written in different programming languages.
5 The WSNM Cloud-Based Application
In this section we provide the proof-of-concept design of the proposed cloud ap-
plication. We assume that the Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) Cloud Provider
gives support for SGX-equipped processors and that in a Platform-as-a-Service
(PaaS) delivery are available standard databases (specifically Key/Value stor-
age) and coordination services.
In a first stage we present a general architecture of the WSN cloud-based mon-
itoring application showing how the data flows from the WSN to the cloud.
Then, we go further in the discussion analyzing the approach that could be fol-
lowed to enhancing security of our SCADA application. Finally, we survey the
technologies that may be used to realize the proposed application.
5.1 General Architecture Overview
Figure 1 reports the general architecture of our WSN cloud-based monitoring
application. On the infrastructure side, sensors deployed around the WSN are
responsible for retrieving measurements related to specific physical phenomena;
their measurement signals are converted to digital data by means of signals con-
verters components, known as Remote Terminal Unit (RTU).
The data acquired by the sensors is then transmitted to a Data Communication
Layer (DCL). This consists of ”Data Logger” equipment, which allow secure
communication between RTUs and the control/monitoring system by means of
heterogeneous data communication layers, adopting different physical communi-
cation media and technologies (i.e., wired and wireless). Multiple equipment are
deployed around the WSN, each one is responsible of a group of sensors installed
nearby.
Subsequently, all the sensors data collected by the DCLs is given to Gateway
machines in charge of preprocessing and then transmitting the sensor data ac-
quired to the cloud platform. A gateway acts as a bridge between the WSN
critical infrastructure and the cloud by providing interfaces for two communica-
tion protocols, one for the infrastructure and one for the cloud side.
The acquired data coming from the WSN is sent to the Message Broker layer,
the mean through which the different Services (S) communicate at cloud-level.
The broker distributes data, messages and events to all the units involved, in
charge of specific functionalities, e.g, data storage management, data computa-
tion, data provision and alarms management. Besides the storage of the business
critical data, both batch and real-time processing needed to make historical and
real-time parameters calculations leverage the highly scalable compute capacity
offered by the cloud platform. Except for the data acquisition, each feature of
the WSN application is supposed to be executed at cloud-level.
5.2 An Innovative Approach to Secure Data in a Cloud
Environment
Malicious attacks to the sensor data of the CIs SCADA system residing in the
cloud are the main concern. The security open issues, listed in 3, deserve an
innovative solution that may be able to give guarantees and trust even when
a malicious insider with administrator privileges tries to manipulate sensitive
data. A solution that may succeed in what the homomorphic encryption failed,
Fig. 1. WSN Monitoring Application General Scheme
e.g., the computation efficiency.
Therefore, we propose the usage of a novel technology recently released by Intel,
namely Software Guard eXtension (SGX) [12], which is gaining more and more
momentum in the research community, to harden our SCADA application.
Fundamentals of Intel SGX Intel SGX can be conceived as a ”Reverse Sand-
box”, which aims to protect the integrity and confidentiality of code and data
by creating a reserved memory space known as enclave able to protect an ap-
plication from the external environment (including the OS or the Hypervisor).
The enclave contains the sensitive data and the code that uses it. By doing so,
SGX enables users to enforce the security of their code and data without having
to trust the cloud provider.
Key point of SGX is the remote software attestation [11] feature useful to prove
the goodness of a piece of software running in an enclave. Such a process con-
vinces an enclave that it is communicating with another enclave that has a
specific measurement hash, that is running in a secure environment and that
has not been modified. The mutual verification between the enclaves is enforced
by using a processor key, which is accessible only by a special enclave known as
Quoting Enclave.
SGX supports both an intra-attestation and an inter-attestation service, that is,
the SGX-enabled procedure of enclave identity verification can be empowered
between two enclaves residing on the same host or between two enclaves residing
in different hosts. The remote attestation service builds a secure channel between
the two enclaves by performing a Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
Designing a SGX-Enabled Application Hardening the monitoring applica-
tion with Intel SGX is challenging. A first question that may arise is: how to
design the application using secure enclaves. An example of an approach has
been proposed by Baumann et al. [13] that included in the enclaves LibOS, a set
of libraries able to run on a dedicated minimal kernel API surface. While this
solution has the advantage of allowing the execution of generic applications with
SGX, it has the drawback of a too big Trusted Computing Base (TCB) into the
enclaves that could lead to security leaks.
Another possibility is to properly partition an application in order to keep the
TCB as small as possible. Certainly, it is a non-trivial approach as it is quite
difficult to figure out how to define the partitions. Such a solution was adopted
by Schuster et al. [14] that partitioned a Hadoop MapReduce framework in order
to enforce secure data analytics using SGX.
Finally, a third approach, the one we propose to adopt, is to use microser-
vices into the enclave leveraging the intrinsic properties of microservices, that
is, a framework with already well-partitioned functionalities. The only drawback
coming from this solution is that the developer needs to re-engineer the applica-
tion in order to define the microservices that need to be put into the enclaves.
However, in the context of CIs this is acceptable because many industries require
a dedicated application which already embeds a re-engineering process.
Because the microservice frameworks usually rely on other external services (e.g.
databases, coordination services), it is equally important to ensure the execu-
tion of their security-critical functionalities inside the enclaves to guarantee a
360◦protection. A method for partitioning the trusted and the untrusted parts
of these services should be found as protecting the data at rest and the data in
transit is also of concern.
5.3 Implementation Details
Starting from the requirements imposed by the WSN use case and from the
design approach requirements needed to use SGX, we revised the architecture
of a typical SCADA system to create a secure reactive cloud application. These
growing class of applications, widely used in the Internet of Things (IoT) world,
are typically highly interactive, scalable, resilient, responsive and event driven;
a set of characteristics perfectly in line with the application Non-Functional re-
quirements defined in 4.2.
Following a well-consolidated trend in the cloud world, we propose a SCADA
application with a microservice architecture. This software pattern allows ap-
plications to be composed of modular, independent, autonomous, self-contained
service units.
The glue between the microservices is needed: an open source framework known
as vert.x 4 can do that, it is the base for distributed reactive application based
on microservices. Vert.x is a polyglot event-driven application framework, which
abstracts from multi-threaded programming allowing to write thread-safe con-
current applications as single-threaded ones. It is platform-independent and em-
ploys an asynchronous, actor-like programming model using event handlers. Its
nervous system is the highly scalable EventBus which allows the communica-
tion of the microservices units through different type of messaging patterns
(e.g. publish/subscribe, point to point). In SCADA case, the preferred path is a
Publish/Subscribe communication pattern: each sensor data is published on the
EventBus by the Gateway and all the interested microservices subscribe them-
selves to the topic (or the sensor) of interest.
The WSN application is composed by different microservices, namely verticles in
vert.x jargon, that interact between them through the EventBus. Each verticle
represents a microservice responsible of an independent process. Thus, in our
application most important are: the ”Data Collector” (or Data Publisher) which
acquires data from the sensors and transmit everything to the vert.x Event-
Bus responsible of sorting it to the subscribed verticles; the ”Access Controller”
which enforces authentication and authorization policies to allow the access to
the resources; the ”Alarm Manager” which realize the stream processing to sig-
nal alarms or critical conditions; the ”Archiver” responsible of storing Real-Time
and Historical data into the correspondent databases; the ”Web Proxy” which
acts as medium between users connected to the dashboard and application’s re-
sources; and finally the ”Dashboard GUI” which provides a web-based Human
Machine Interface (HMI) to monitor sensors’ status.
All the above mentioned services should run partially inside of enclaves and par-
tially outside enclaves. The goal is to protect the usage of the private datasets
into secure enclaves and, equally important, to enforce the communication of
these data through secure enclaves channel. Leveraging the remote attestation
feature of SGX can help in this sense. The on-site gateway and the broker on
the cloud platform attest each other identities establishing in this way a secure
channel. The data will be exchanged only between enclaves and will never be
decrypted out of them.
To do that, a SGX-enabled version of vert.x must be provided. Vert.x applica-
tions runs on top of the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Extending vert.x means
including, first, the JVM into the secure enclaves of SGX in order to enable the
usage of SGX-aware security-critical functionalities of vert.x. The inclusion of
vert.x into a SGX enclave can not leave aside the JVM but the Oracle’s HotSpot
would be unfeasible. A lighter version of the JVM is desirable, the JamVM 5 rep-
resents a good compromise even though lacks the Just-In-Time (JIT) compiler,
which means a degradation of performances.
The SCADA application requires persistent storage of the time series data gen-
erated by the data acquisition equipment. All data in the database should be
encrypted at rest and only be accessible to clients holding the decryption key.
4 http://vertx.io
5 http://jamvm.sourceforge.net
For what about the databases, MongoDB represents a good choice. This suits
really good for its key-value intrinsic characteristic. In fact, the problem of store
and retrieve big amount of data at a high rate is well addressed by Mongo
through the typical key-value storage system which collides perfectly with the
requirements of a real-time monitoring system characterized by time series data.
In order to optimize read/write operations, the data stored is organized as fol-
lows: each minute represents a Mongo document and samples of the specific
minute (60 samples, one per second) are stored inside it.
A secure version of the key-value storage system needs that the data is encrypted
before being stored with a specific key and that data can only be decrypted by
the owner of the key. An extension of Mongo should include new storage func-
tions in which the encryption and the decryption, transparently to the user,
happens into SGX enclaves.
Another noteworthy architectural element is the Alarms Management System
that meets requirement FR3. We propose EsperTech CEP6. This is a Complex
Event Processing (CEP) system that identifies and analyzes cause-and-effect re-
lationships among events in real time. Every abnormal situation generates events
interpreted by the CEP that, based on the rules defined by the administrator,
enforces a correlation process and outputs a single alarm level. What is extremely
sensitive for the CEP security is the event correlation. Such a process needs to be
enforced in the enclaves to ensure that the monitoring events won’t be modified.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we described the approach conducted to design a secure cloud
application for a critical infrastructure using new Intel ISA extension known as
SGX. We highlighted the positive effects of a migration of critical infrastructures
IT to a cloud environment but also what this may result in terms of security.
Then, we presented a proof-of-concept of a SGX-enabled SCADA application
that may address some open issues that are now hampering the adoption of
cloud technologies in the field of CIs. Our work was strengthened through a
real use case consisting in a water supply network that provided requirements
extremely useful for the analysis.
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